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ESSAY
WARMING UP TO CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
Jonathan H. Adler*

T

HERE was never any doubt that Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency1 (“Mass. v. EPA”) would be a closely watched
and hotly contested case. Nor was there much question that Justice
Anthony Kennedy would provide the pivotal swing vote. On many of
the issues before the Court, the remaining justices were sure to be evenly
divided. Justice Kennedy has shown an uncanny ability to find himself
in the majority in close cases—environmental cases in particular2—and
this would be no exception.
The surprise in Mass. v. EPA is the facility and ease with which the
Court dispatched opposing arguments and redefined prior precedents.
Not content to widen doctrines on the margins, Justice Stevens’ majority
opinion blazed a new path through the law of standing and unearthed
newfound regulatory authority for the United States Environmental
Protection Agency. Under the Court’s new interpretation, the Clean Air
Act (“CAA” or “the Act”) provides EPA with roving authority, if not
responsibility, to regulate any substance capable of causing or
contributing to environmental harm in the atmosphere.
*Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western

Reserve University School of Law. He participated in an amicus curiae brief of law
professors and the Cato Institute in Massachusetts v. EPA, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/legalbriefs/ma_v_epa_10-24-06.pdf.
1
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
2
See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 703, 712–15 (2000) (noting that Justice Kennedy was
in the majority in environmental cases more than any other justice).
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The federal government did much to facilitate this course. At least
since when Clinton EPA General Counsel Jonathan Cannon first
suggested EPA’s preexisting regulatory authority could reach
greenhouse gases,3 various agencies laid the groundwork for the
eventual regulation of greenhouse gases. Even during the second Bush
Administration, EPA has been anything but a reluctant regulator, and as
such the present administration was not the most compelling advocate
for its own cause.
Now that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases, regulatory
controls on motor vehicles (as well as on other sources of greenhouse
gases, including utilities and industrial facilities) are sure to follow. In
time, however, Mass. v. EPA may come to stand for more than the
simple proposition that Congress delegated authority to regulate
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. It may herald in a new era of
state-sponsored litigation, environmental standing, and statutory
interpretation—and yet still do little to cool down a warming planet.
GEORGIA ON MY MIND
Whether the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, or any other
petitioner, had standing to challenge EPA’s failure to regulate
greenhouse gases was a threshold issue for the Court. The question of
standing had divided three ways a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,4 and was heavily briefed by the parties and
amici. Although many assumed the Court would focus on the specific
claims of standing put forward by Massachusetts, few expected the
Court to announce a new rule for state standing in lawsuits brought
against the federal government.
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion announced that “[s]tates are not
normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.”5
Where private litigants would continue to face the demanding standing
inquiry outlined in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,6 states would receive
“special solicitude” and have less difficulty invoking the jurisdiction of
3
Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, Environmental Protection
Agency, to Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (April 10,
1998),
available
at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannonmemorandum.pdf.
4
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
5
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
6
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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federal courts.7 Such a special standard had not been identified before,
so the majority had to reach back—way back—for authority to support
its position, ultimately seizing upon Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Company, a century-old case in which the state of Georgia brought suit
in federal court against a polluting factory across the border in
Tennessee in federal court under the federal common law of nuisance.8
Although the Commonwealth of Massachusetts argued that it had
“special standing” as a state, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper was nowhere
to be found in Massachusetts’ briefs. Neither, for that matter, was it
cited by any of the parties or amici in their briefs, nor was it considered
by any of the opinions below. State amici Arizona, et al., argued that
states had unique interests worthy of consideration in the standing
inquiry, but still did not mention Georgia. The simplest explanation for
Georgia’s conspicuous absence from the briefing is that the decision
does not support the proposition for which it was cited.
Justice Kennedy referenced the Georgia opinion as Massachusetts’
“best case” supporting standing during oral argument,9 but his reasons
for doing so are not entirely clear. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
involved Georgia’s effort to obtain an injunction against upwind
polluters across the Tennessee state border. Justice Holmes held for the
Court that Georgia could obtain equitable relief—unavailable to private
parties—because of the state’s “quasi-sovereign” interest in its territory.
Yet it is one thing to hold that one state cannot foul the air of its
neighbor. It is quite another to maintain that a state’s ability to vindicate
such a claim on behalf of its citizens gives rise to a “special solicitude”
when a state sues in federal court to invoke the regulatory apparatus of
administrative agencies. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in dissent,
Congress knew how to show a “special solicitude” for state interests
under the Clean Air Act, as it did in Section 12610 when it explicitly
authorized state petitions seeking greater protection from upwind
pollution sources.11 Yet nothing in the Act, or administrative practice,
suggests the sort of “special solicitude” the Court found here.

7

Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455.
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
9
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120).
10
See 42 U.S.C. § 7426 (2000).
11
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b)
(2000).
8
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Somewhat ironically, the underlying claim in Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper, a claim of interstate nuisance under federal common law, is
almost certainly preempted by the statute under which Massachusetts
sought relief. The Supreme Court has long held that comprehensive
environmental regulatory schemes preempt claims that interstate
pollution constitutes a nuisance under federal common law.12 Were the
facts of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to arise today, the state of Georgia
would be unable to pursue its specific claim in federal court. Moreover,
with the Mass. v. EPA Court holding that the Clean Air Act applies to
greenhouse gases, nuisance claims relating to global warming are most
likely preempted as well.
WHAT’S LEFT STANDING OF STANDING?
The Mass. v. EPA court was not simply “solicitous” of states. It
weakened the traditional requirements for Article III standing as well.
Under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, standing requires that the plaintiff
have suffered an “injury in fact” that is “actual or imminent” and
“concrete and particularized.” The injury must be “fairly traceable” to
the conduct complained of, and it must be likely that “the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”13 The Court purported to adhere to
this “most demanding” standard in evaluating Massachusetts’ claims,
while actually interpreting Lujan’s requirements in a most forgiving
way, particularly with regard to causation and redressability.
An initial difficulty for petitioners’ standing claim is the
undifferentiated nature of climate change. Global climate change, by
definition, affects the global climate. As such, injuries predicated on
global warming would seem to constitute the archetypal “generalized
grievance” common to all members of the public; and as such, it is unfit
for judicial resolution. The question is not whether climate change is
real, or whether human activities have contributed and will contribute to

12
See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the Clean Water
Act preempts interstate nuisance claims for water pollution under federal common law); see
also Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law
of Interstate Nuisance, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 717, 768–69 n.476 (2004) (“Although the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the question of whether the federal Clean Air Act preempts
federal common law in disputes over transboundary air pollution, it is widely assumed to do
so, particularly in light of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which created a
comprehensive federal permit scheme similar to that established by the Clean Water Act.”)
13
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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a warming of the atmosphere, but rather whether global changes that
affect all citizens of the United States—indeed all citizens of the
world—are sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy Article
III’s requirements. That climate change is an urgent concern matters not
at all in the standing analysis, for the question is one of whether federal
courts should intervene, not whether a given question is worthy of
federal action. As traditionally understood, Article III standing required
(in Justice Kennedy’s words) that petitioners demonstrate “that the
action injures [them] in a concrete and personal way.”14
Massachusetts’ injury—or at least the only injury considered by the
majority—is its claim of present and future sea level rise exacerbated by
human contributions to the greenhouse effect.15 While some portion of
sea level rise is due to natural phenomena, the petitioners submitted
affidavits detailing estimates and projections of future increases in sea
level over the next several decades that would be due, in part, to human
emissions of greenhouse gases. Yet insofar as petitioners’ standing claim
was dependent at all on such future projections, such as potential losses
of coast “by 2100,”16 the injuries alleged are too remote and distant in
time to satisfy the traditional requirement that an alleged injury be
“actual or imminent.” Under the law before this case, a future injury
would not do.
Although there is no question that (again, in Justice Kennedy’s words
repeated in Mass. v. EPA), “Congress has the power to define injuries
and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before,”17 Congress did no such thing
here. Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act is a jurisdictional provision; it
does not create a new cause of action.18 Nor did it meet the requirement,
restated by the majority, that “Congress . . . at the very least identify the
14

Id. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Here it is worth noting that the majority opinion misquotes the relevant affidavits so as
to overstate the contribution of global warming to sea level rise. The majority asserts that
“global sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a
result of global warming.” Yet the affidavit cited for this proposition is more circumspect,
merely stating that warming-induced melting of glaciers and thermal expansion of the oceans
“were the major contributions” to the estimated sea level rise of 10 to 20 centimeters over
the past century. See MacCracken Decl. ¶5(c), Jt. App. at 225, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct.
1438 (No. 05-1120).
16
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 n.20 (discussing “possible” effects of sea level rise
over the next century).
17
Id. at 1453 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
18
See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).
15
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injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons
entitled to bring suit.”19
To cover this analytical hole, the majority relies upon language from
Lujan noting the “normal standards for redressability and immediacy”
are relaxed when a statute vests a litigant with a “procedural right.”20
This is the rationale for recognizing environmental litigants’ standing to
enforce other laws that impose only procedural obligations on regulatory
agencies, such as the National Environmental Policy Act. But the Clean
Air Act provision has nothing to do with Massachusetts’ claims in this
case, as the does not establish equivalent procedural rights, at least not
as such terms have been defined to date. Rather, Massachusetts claimed
substantive injury for which Massachusetts sought substantive relief.
If the majority stretched the standing inquiry at the margins to
accommodate the petitioners’ claim of injury, it rent Lujan’s fabric in
considering causation and redressability. Under Mass. v. EPA, any
contribution of any size to a cognizable injury is sufficient for causation,
and any step, no matter how small, is sufficient to provide the necessary
redress. While citing the requirement that a favorable decision must
“relieve a discrete injury” to the plaintiff,21 the majority holds that any
government action that, all else equal, reduces (or at least retards the
growth of) global emissions of greenhouse gases by any amount will
suffice. After all, Justice Stevens explained, “a reduction in domestic
emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter
what happens elsewhere.”22 Yet given the rate of growth in greenhouse
gas emissions worldwide, irrespective of what happens in the United
States, this is anything but a self-evident proposition.
I DO NOT THINK IT MEANS WHAT YOU THINK IT MEANS
The Mass. v. EPA majority determined that the Clean Air Act
provides “unambiguous” authority for EPA to regulate the most
ubiquitous by-product of modern industrial civilization, even though
Congress never once recognized or ratified such an intent in explicit
terms.23 No matter. The majority held that such ratification is
19

Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 580
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
20
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560–61.
21
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1458 (emphasis added).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1460.
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unnecessary, even were it to produce potentially incongruous results (a
consequence the majority denies), because the Act’s “broad language”
was designed to ensure sufficient “flexibility” so as to ensure the Clean
Air Act would not become obsolete.24 Congressional revision of the Act
is unnecessary so long as the language can be read so as to ensure
federal authority to act, even if in unforeseen (and perhaps even
undesirable) ways.
The claim that the Clean Air Act confers regulatory authority upon
EPA to regulate greenhouse gases has a superficial plausibility. After all,
the majority notes, “air pollution” is defined in capacious terms by the
Act.25 Yet individual provisions of complex statutory provisions should
not be read in isolation, certainly not when the potential implications are
vast. Rather, they must be read in context, as part of a statutory whole.
The relevant statutory provisions were enacted and revised to control
local and regional air pollution, such as soot and smog. Where Congress
sought to authorize the regulation of transboundary or atmospheric
pollutants as such (e.g., ozone depleting substances or precursors to acid
rain), it adopted additional, specialized provisions for this purpose. As
the Clean Air Act is read in Mass. v. EPA, however, such action was
wholly unnecessary, for the general air pollution provisions already
granted EPA ample authority to address all matter of substances that are
emitted into the air. Indeed, such an interpretation is not merely
plausible, according to the Court, but required.
The history of air pollution control belies such an interpretation of the
Act. From the late 1970s to the present, Congress repeatedly considered
climate change legislation, and consistently refused to authorize
regulatory controls on greenhouse gas emissions. Beginning with the
National Climate Program Act of 1978, Congress sought to develop a
“national climate policy,” yet never delegated regulatory authority over
greenhouse gases, as such, to EPA. To the contrary, Congress
encouraged the adoption of “nonregulatory” approaches to climate
change concerns. Indeed, Congress explicitly considered the adoption of
vehicle emission controls when debating the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments. A provision to require such controls was approved by the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, but then stricken
before final passage of the bill due to heated opposition.
24
25

Id. at 1462.
See id. at 1460 (noting the CAA’s “sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’”).
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Not only did Congress never explicitly authorize EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles or any other source, it
explicitly denied EPA such authority when unilateral agency action
seemed a possibility. When the Clinton EPA suggested it had the
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions despite the absence of
explicit authority, Congress responded with appropriations riders
explicitly barring the expenditure of any EPA funds on developing or
implementing such rules. Only when control of EPA returned to
Republican hands, and the threat of unilateral administrative action on
climate change dissipated, did Congress relent in this course.
The majority dismissed these and other actions by Congress as
nothing more than “postenactment legislative history.”26 Yet what the
Court faced here were not post hoc explanations of legislative intent or
efforts to spin ambiguous statutory language. Rather it is an unbroken
chain of Congressional action predicated on a common understanding of
what Congress itself had wrought. The issue is not what members of
Congress said to justify their actions, but what Congress as a whole
actually did.
Though denied by the majority, Mass. v. EPA had much in common
with FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation,27 a decision
which is now likely confined to its facts. In Brown & Williamson the
Court invalidated the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA’s”) effort
to extend its regulatory authority to tobacco products. There, the Court
found sufficient reason to hesitate before presuming that Congress had
authorized an administrative agency to assert previously unrecognized
“jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of
the American economy.”28 If anything, Mass. v. EPA was an even more
“extraordinary case[]”29 for a consequence of the Court’s holding in
Mass. v. EPA will be regulation of much of the American economy, not
merely of a single industry.
If EPA has the authority—indeed, the presumptive obligation—to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under
Section 202 of the Act, it has no less an obligation to regulate emissions
from industrial sources under Section 111 and to require the
promulgation of State Implementation Plans to meet a National Ambient
26

Id.
529 U.S. 120 (2000).
28
Id. at 159.
29
Id.
27
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Air Quality Standard under Sections 108, 109 and 110. The
endangerment standard triggering regulation under each set of
provisions is the same.30 Given the clear irrationality—if not
impossibility—of regulating atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations
like localized concentrations of urban smog, this would seem no less of
an improbable result than the federal ban on cigarettes the Court feared
would result from FDA tobacco regulation . If this does not satisfy the
Court’s standard for a “counterintuitive” result, there is not likely to be
anything else that ever will.
It is one thing to accept Congress’ explicit decisions to engage in
broad delegations of quasi-legislative authority to administrative
agencies, as the Court has done time and again over the past sixty years.
It is quite another to conjure a delegation of awesome regulatory
authority from statutory provisions that were never intended to be used
for this purpose. Regulatory tools are delegated to agencies with specific
language for particular purposes. Once granted, these tools are not freeranging objects to be wielded as agencies, courts, or private litigants
would like. Yet that is precisely the interpretation Mass. v. EPA gives to
the Clean Air Act. Given the significance of climate change and
Congress’ repeated attention to climate change policy over the past
thirty years, it defies common sense that Congress would have granted
to EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gases with nary a peep as to
such intent. And even if one were to conclude that a delegation of
authority is possible, it is a stretch to argue that the Clean Air Act’s
language is so unambiguous as to preclude a contrary conclusion from
the agency itself.31
SLEEPING IN THE BED EPA MADE
If one ignores the problems plaguing petitioners’ claims of standing,
and accepts the Court’s discovery of EPA’s latent power over emissions
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, it is easy to conclude that
30

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2000) and 42
U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2000).
31
While EPA previously concluded that it had the latent authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act, it was not until the Bush Administration’s petition denial that
EPA reached such a conclusion after going through a notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Thus, if either interpretation of the Act was due Chevron deference, it would have been
EPA’s later conclusion that it lacked regulatory authority to control emissions of greenhouse
gases.
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EPA’s effort to explain its decision not to regulate was inadequate.
Assuming it had the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, EPA
announced it would decline to do so, because such action was unwise at
this time. The Agency cited various reasons, including the fact that the
Bush Administration had already undertaken other policies to “reduce
the risk” of global climate change.32 Yet as the Mass. v. EPA majority
noted, the reasons proffered by the agency failed to conform to the
requirements of the Clean Air Act.
In denying the petition, EPA endorsed the President’s statement that
the federal government “must address” climate change, but suggested
the nature of the problem recommended a “different policy approach”
than that sought by the petitioners.33 EPA argued, plausibly, that it does
not “make sense” to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles, because this would constitute “an inefficient, piecemeal
approach” to the issue.34 Few climate policy experts believe such
regulations would constitute a particularly effective or efficient means of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet the policy judgment to regulate
such emissions—if they contribute to pollution that “may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”—had already been
made by Congress.35
The endangerment standard established by CAA Section 202 is
generally precautionary in nature. If EPA concludes air pollution “may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” it is
required to regulate. That is the import of the word “shall” in the
statute.36 EPA could have refused to make a judgment. As a legal matter,
EPA might also have been able to conclude that greenhouse gas
emissions do not, in the judgment of the Administrator, contribute to air
pollution that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare” (though this would have been a difficult proposition to
maintain given EPA’s and other federal agencies’ prior and
32

Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,925
(Sept. 8, 2003).
33
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,929–
52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003). This apparent inconsistency in EPA’s arguments was not lost on the
majority, which “attach[ed] considerable significance” to Agency statements that global
warming is a problem that must be addressed. See 127 S. Ct. at 1458.
34
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,931(Sept. 8, 2003).
35
See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
36
See id.
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contemporary pronouncements on the subject). What EPA could not do,
however, is precisely what it did: acknowledge the threat posed by
greenhouse gases, but refuse to regulate on other grounds.
Justice Scalia’s dissent sought to vindicate the Agency’s authority to
set its own priorities, particularly when refusing to act. Justice Scalia is
no doubt correct that if EPA had simply deferred to make any judgment
about whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate change
that could harm public health or welfare, that decision would be entitled
to great deference. The majority opinion also endorses a quite
deferential standard of review of such matters. Yet that is not what EPA
did. In denying the petition, EPA did not refuse to make a judgment
about the risks posed by climate change. Instead, it refused to regulate.
Although the result—no regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under
CAA Section 202—is the same, the decisions are quite distinct, as Scalia
himself notes in his dissent.37 If EPA sought not to regulate, it should
have refused to make a judgment about the risks posed by climate
change, rather than second-guess the precautionary policy judgment
made Congress when enacting the Clean Air Act. Given EPA’s many
statements about the risks of climate change, a refusal to make an
endangerment finding under Section 202 would have been vulnerable to
court challenge, but less so than the course EPA actually took.
CLIMATE POLICY 2.0
As this is being written, the wheels of federal climate regulation are
already in motion. Without any further action by Congress, the
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under
Section 202 is a near absolute certainty, as is the regulation of industrial
and utility emissions under Section 111. Litigation to force the listing of
carbon dioxide as a criteria air pollutant, and requiring the establishment
of a National Ambient Air Quality Standard, such as those that exist for
ozone, particulates and other ambient pollutants, will not be far behind.
At this point, if not before, Congress will be compelled to act.
Although a Supreme Court majority has concluded that the Clean Air
Act applies to greenhouse gases, few (if any) seriously contend that the
Act’s provisions are well-suited to the problem of climate change. Even
if one assumes the United States should take unilateral action—in the
absence of cooperative efforts by the other users of the atmosphere,
37

Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1472 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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which is the world’s greatest common pool resource—applying the
Clean Air Act’s specific requirements to greenhouse gases makes little
sense. As even further regulatory pressure is brought to bear on
American industry by states eager to jump aboard the climate policy
bandwagon, new federal regulation is sure to arise. And this, perhaps,
was the point. Massachusetts and others engaged in strategic litigation to
create leverage for a new generation of environmental controls. Yet once
the smoke clears, and new climate policies are in place, the legal
consequences of Mass. v. EPA will remain.
Preferred Citation: Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate
Change Litigation, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 61 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf.

